Allocating the Burden of Proof To Effectuate the Preservation and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act

Martin J. LaLonde
Winding its way along 95,000 miles of beaches, inlets, estuaries, harbors, and ports, the U.S. coastline is one of America's most diverse and valuable assets. 1 It contains a rich supply of marine and mineral resources as well as abundant natural beauty. These very features, however, have led to increasing population along the coast and accelerating demands for coastal development, both of which increase pressure on this fragile ecosystem. 2 Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) 3 to address the problems associated with degradation of marine estuaries and coastal areas. 4 The Act implements a unique cooperative management scheme between the federal and coastal state governments that accounts for both national and local interests in coastal resources 5 and seeks to accommodate both preservation and development concerns. 6 Congress intended that the effective management of the coastal areas and resolution of conflicts between competing uses would help protect this national asset for future generations. 7 The CZMA encourages states to implement coastal management programs (CMPs) to protect their portions of the coastal zone 8 and to [Vol. 92:438 court needs to know which party bears the burden of proof1 8 on the issue of consistency so that it may properly rule on certain motions, decide the merits, or instruct the jury. The CZMA provides no explicit guidance on who bears the burden. In addition, few courts have addressed the burden of proof issue in a consistency dispute, and those that have faced the question have reached different conclusions. For example, the Massachusetts District Court, in Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 19 stated: "It is plain from the language of the Act and regulations that the burden of establishing compliance with a state program is on the federal agency proposing the contemplated action, and not on the state." 20 Other cases, however, suggest that the state bears the burden. For example, in California v. Watt, 21 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal agency makes the final consistency determination, implying that the state bears the burden of proving that the determination was incorrect. 2 2 Likewise, in Louisiana v. Lujan, 23 the Louisiana District Court held that the state had to prove that the federal consistency determination was arbitrary or otherwise not in accordance with law.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the allocation of the burden of proof "is, of course, rarely without consequence and frequently may be dispositive to the outcome of the litigation." 24 The burden of proof allocation in a CZMA consistency dispute has consequences beyond the outcome of a particular case; resolution of the division within the courts over the CZMA burden allocation will influence the balance between state and federal control of the coastal zone and between preservation and development interests under the Act. 25 An improper allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of consistency could undermine Congress's intent regarding these balances. 26 Primarily due to policy considerations, this Note argues that courts should allocate to the federal agency proposing an activity that 18 . The term burden of proof encompasses both the burden of production and burden of persuasion. See infra note 75.
19. 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), ajfd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983) .
20. 560 F. Supp. at 576. 21. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982 , revd. sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U. S. 312 (1984) .
22. 683 F.2d at 1263-67; see infra note 94 and accompanying text. 23. 777 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991 ). 24. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976 . 25. See infra section 111.C. 26. Courts can easily and unobtrusively affect congressional policy through the allocation of the burden of proof. As one commentator noted, "burden rules seldom touch 'the major prejudices of the age.' They are quiet, bland, unspectacular. As a result, juggling them in favor of one interest or another tends to go unheeded -and uncriticized. Policies can be promoted or stifled smoothly, quietly, and without controversy.'' James E. Krier, Environmental Litigationmay affect the coastal zone the burden of proving consistency with a state CMP. This allocation effectuates Congress's intent to vest states with primary control to preserve the coastal zone. Part I provides a general background of the Act's consistency requirement for federally conducted activities. Part II examines the various factors that courts traditionally consider when allocating burdens of proof in litigation. Part III evaluates these factors as applied to the consistency issue under the CZMA. Part IV concludes that courts should assign the initial burden of production to the state contesting a federal agency's consistency determination; the ultimate burden of proving that the activity is consistent with a state CMP, however, belongs with the federal agency.
I. CZMA CONSISTENCY DETERMINATIONS
This Part explains the CZMA's section 307(c)(l) consistency determination process for federally conducted or supported activities. 27 Section I.A outlines the federal activities for which the statute requires a consistency determination. Section I.B surveys the procedural steps required to obtain a consistency determination and the dispute resolution mechanism.
A. Federal Activities That Require Consistency Determinations
From the 1980s until the passage of the CZMA amendments in 1990, the most controversial issue under the Coastal Zone Management Act was how to define the scope of the consistency requirement for federally conducted activities. Although the amendments have conclusively resolved the issue, an examination of this past controversy serves as important background for understanding the current operation of the consistency provision.
As originally enacted, the CZMA consistency provision stated: "Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." 28 Initial cases broadly interpreted this provision to apply to federal activities that affected the 27. Different consistency requirements also arise under § 1456(c)(3) when privately conducted coastal activities require a federal license or permit. Private parties conducting federally permitted or licensed activities must provide to "the licensing or permitting agency a certification that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner consistent with the program." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1990) . Each applicant for a federal license or permit must also submit a copy of the certification to the appropriate state agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1990) . Because different dispute resolution mechanisms exist for federally permitted or licensed activities, this Note deals exclusively with consistency requirements for federally conducted activities arising under § 1456(c)(l).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l) (1990) (emphasis added). The CZMA regulations define "maximum extent practicable" as "fully consistent with such programs unless compliance is prohibited based upon the requirements of existing law applicable to the Federal agency's operations." 15 [Vol. 92:438 coastal zone whether within or outside its physical limits. 29 In 1984, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the consistency doctrine in Secretary of the Interior v. California. 30 The Court re· stricted the consistency requirement to activities within a certain geo· graphical area, 31 concluding that " [s] ection 307(c)(l)'s 'directly affecting' language was aimed at activities conducted or supported by federal agencies on federal lands physically situated in the coastal zone." 32 As a result, the Court excluded from the consistency require· ment any federally conducted activities on federal land outside the coastal zone, such as in the OCS. 33 In addition, the Court narrowly construed the "directly affecting" language of CZMA section 307(c){l) by finding an insufficient causal connection between the chal-C.F.R. § 930.32 (1993) . See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text for discussion of approval of states' coastal management plan.
29. See Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, (D. Mass.) , ajfd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983 ); California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 , 1368 -82 (C.D. Cal. 1981 , modified, 683 F.2d 1253 683 F.2d (9th Cir. 1982 , revd. sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U. S. 312 (1984) .
30. 464 U.S. 312 (1984) . As in most § 307(c)(l) consistency disputes, this case involved a state challenge to the Department of Interior's leasing of OCS tracts for oil and gas exploration and development. See supra note 13.
31. In the early 1980s, the executive branch also restricted the consistency doctrine, and threatened the very existence of the CZMA program. The Reagan administration suggested eliminating CZMA funding and sought to increase OCS leasing. See OFFICE OF THE PRES!· DENT, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR EcoNOMIC RECOVERY 4-36 to 4-37 (1981) ; Proposed 5-Year OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981) (proposed July 28, 1981) ENVTL. L. & POLY. 1, 18 (1985) . Congress initially assented to the administration's overtures but reestablished funding for the program in 1983. Id. at 19. On a different front, the White House instructed the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) -the Department of Commerce agency responsible for overseeing the Act, 15 C.F.R. § § 923, 930 (1991) -to review state CMPs to ensure that the plans accounted for the national interest in energy development. Tim Eichenberg & Jack Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal Zone Management and ''New Federalism," 14 EcoLOGY L.Q. 9, 12-13 & n.12 (1987) . The NOAA rejected a number of local coastal plans that were to be incorporated into state CMPs, and it contested the implementation of certain approved CMPs on the grounds that they restricted energy development. See Eichenberg & Archer, supra, at 12-13 & n.14. Federal agencies further encroached on the CZMA through their efforts to limit delegation of extensive consistency control to the states. Id. at 12 & n.8.; see [15 Current Developments] 33. 464 U.S. at 330. In his dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that no sensible distinction can be drawn "between activities that take place outside the coastal zone and those that occur within the zone; it is the effect of the activities rather than their location that is relevant." 464 U.S. at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also 695-96 (1986). lenged federal activity and the potential effects to the coastal zone. 3 4 After extensive hearings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 35 Congress responded to the Supreme Court decision by enacting the Coastal Zone Management Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990. 36 The amendments changed the language relating to consistency requirements of federal agency activities. The amended section states that "[e]ach Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs." 37 This provision mandates that the effect rather than the location determines whether federal activities require a consistency determination. The amendment broadens the "directly affecting" standard of the prior CZMA and expressly overturns Secretary of the Interior v. California. 38 Thus, whenever a fed-34. 464 U.S. at 331-43. The lease sale, the Court reasoned, made up only one of four steps that could lead to oil or gas production in the OCS. 464 U.S. at 337. According to the Court, the steps required by the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 for developing offshore oil include: "(l) formulation of a 5-year leasing plan by the Department of the Interior; (2) lease sales; (3) exploration by the lessees; (4) development and production." 464 U.S. at 337. The Court reasoned that only in the final two stages do activities occur that may directly affect the coastal zone. 464 U.S. at 338-41. This point drew substantial criticism from the dissenting opinion and later from commentators. Justice Stevens's dissent noted that:
The sale of OCS leases involves the expenditure of millions of dollars. If exploration and development of the leased tracts cannot be squared with the requirements of the CZMA, it would be in everyone's interest to determine that as early as possible. . . . It is directly contrary to the legislative scheme not to make a consistency determination at the earliest possible point. 464 U.S. at 357-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Therefore, according to Stevens, the link between the lease sales, which the majority exempted from consistency review, and later exploration, which the majority would subject to consistency review, is close enough to justify a finding that the lease sales directly affected the coastal zone. See also Steven R. Schell, Living with the Legacy of the 1970 's: Federal/State Coordination in the Coastal Zone, 14 ENVTL. L. 751, 756-57 (1984 eral agency proposes or conducts an activity that will affect a state's coastal zone, it must follow the procedural requirements for conducting a consistency determination, regardless of where the activity is located.
B. Procedural Requirements and Dispute Resolution
To ensure that existing or proposed federal activities affecting the coastal zone are consistent with a state's CMP, each federal agency conducting, supporting, or planning such an activity "shall provide a consistency determination to the relevant State agency." 39 The determination provides a "detailed description of the activity, its associated facilities, and their coastal zone effects, and comprehensive data and information sufficient to support the Federal agency's consistency statement." 40 If the applicable state agency disagrees with the federal agency's consistency determination, the state agency must explain its objections and propose alternative measures that would allow the federal agency to meet the consistency requirement. 41 Consistency disputes arise when the federal government decides to proceed with the activity as originally planned despite the state's objection. Parties may pursue two methods of dispute resolution when a disagreement arises. First, the parties may agree to submit voluntarily to mediation conducted by the Secretary of Commerce. 42 Alternatively, either party may seek judicial resolution. 43 In addition, after the final judgment of a court and certification by the Secretary that mediation is not likely to resolve the dispute, the President may overCourt in Secretary of the Interior v. California and to make clear that outer Continental Shelf oil and gas lease sales are subject to the requirements of section 307(c)(l)." Id. at H8075 (citation omitted). In essence, the amendment validates Justice Stevens's interpretation of the CZMA.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(C) (Supp. IV 1992) . The consistency determination is provided at the earliest practicable time in the planning or reassessment of the activity. A consistency determination should be prepared following development of sufficient information to determine reasonably the consistency of the activity with the State's management program, but before the Federal agency reaches a significant point of decisionmaking in its review process. 15 C.F.R. § 930.34(b) (1993) .
40. 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(a) (1993) . The statement must take into full account the "enforceable, mandatory policies of the management program" and must also consider the recommendations, rather than mandatory dictates, of the state program. 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(c) (1993) .
41. 15 C.F.R. § 930.42(a) (1993). For instance, as exhibited in Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), affd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1983 ), Massachusetts had responded to the Department of the Interior's consistency determination for offshore oil lease sales by noting that the oil and gas exploration, development, and production that would flow from the lease sale would be inconsistent with the policy of its CMP to minimize impacts on the marine environment and would conflict with maritime-dependent uses. The state suggested deleting certain tracts from the lease sale as a method of making the activity consistent with the CMP. 560 F. Supp. at 574, . See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1988) . But see Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31, at 33 (indicating that mediation has seldom been used and when used has been unsuccessful). ride CZMA consistency requirements when the national interest in the activity is sufficiently compelling. 44 A brief example highlights the significance of burden allocation when a consistency dispute requires judicial resolution. Suppose the Department of the Interior seeks to lease oil and gas exploration rights in the OCS off the coast of California. 45 The federal agency provides the state's coastal commission with a consistency determination declaring, in detail, how the lease sale is consistent with California's CMP. The coastal commission disagrees and informs the Department of the Interior why the proposed activity is inconsistent and what the agency can do to meet the state's consistency requirements. The federal agency stands by its consistency determination and prepares to go ahead with the sale. The state files a claim in federal district court seeking a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a full hearing on the controversy's merits. The state then seeks injunctive relief on the merits to prohibit the lease sale until the federal agency has made its lease sale plans consistent with California's CMP. The allocation of the burden of proof on the consistency determination may affect the court's decision concerning both the preliminary injunction and relief on the merits.
Because the state must establish a likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction, 46 the allocation of the burden of 44. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1991) 46. Traditionally the party seeking a preliminary injunction must in addition establish three other criteria: (1) a substantial threat of irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief; (2) a balance of hardships favoring the state; and (3) the advancement of some discernible public interest by entering injunctive relief. See, e.g., Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 997-98 (11th Cir. 1991); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974 ). The state should be able to meet these additional criteria. First, the state may show a substantial threat of irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief by indicating the loss of control over its coastal zone and by indicating the likely adverse environmental effects from the federal activity.
See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) ("Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable."); califomia v. Mack, 693 F. Supp. 821, 828 (N.D. cat. 1988 48 In adjudicating the merits, the burden allocation may, in a close case, determine who succeeds. Furthermore, the allocation defines the parties' respective roles in the litigation; for example, the allocation determines who must present evidence to support claims of consistency or inconsistency. The allocation will also determine the order of presentation of evidence. 4 9 In addition to affecting the litigation process, the burden allocation may influence each party's settlement position and willingness to compromise. The party bearing the burden of proof may be more amenable to reaching an agreement to avoid litigation. The burdened party may also modify its behavior to avoid disputes.
Because of the issue's multifaceted importance, an explanation of the proper allocation of the burden of proof mandated under the CZMA requires a thorough understanding of factors affecting courts' burden allocation decisions.
II. ALLOCATING BURDENS OF PROOF
This Part examines how courts allocate burdens of proof and how the burden may shift during the course of a trial. Section II.A analyzes factors that courts typically consider when allocating the burden of proof. Occasionally Congress mandates the burden allocation by statute.so Usually, however, Congress fails to do so.st When burden allocation is not mandated by statute, as with the CZMA, courts must themselves decide how to allocate the burdens. Although the ultimate test is congressional intent,s 2 when no intent appears, courts have common law power to allocate the burdens by considering other factors, including the parties' relative ease of access to pertinent evidence, the probability that the situation occurred, which party seeks to the state can show the injunction will advance some discernible public interest by emphasizing the purposes of the CZMA. See infra section 111.C.
47. 777 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (E.D. La. 1991 change the status quo, and whether a certain allocation will effectuate the policy of the underlying law. Section II.B discusses the elements of the burden of proof: the burdens of production and persuasion. As the section explains, courts may in certain circumstances shift these components to different parties.
A. Factors Considered in Allocating the Burden of Proof
When a statute creates a cause of action, a court deciding who bears the burden of proof will initially determine whether Congress has spoken on the issue. 53 Because Congress possesses plenary authority over evidentiary rules in the federal court, its intent is binding. 54 Thus, a court will examine the explicit language of the statute 55 alteration outweigh the damage to the wetlands resource. " 59 If the statute, regulations, and legislative history do not allocate the burden of proof, courts will turn to other factors to assign the burden. 60 First, a court may appraise the "convenience" of placing the burden on a particular party. Thus, the court may require the party who possesses superior "access to knowledge" of the contended fact to bear the burden; 61 a debtor must prove, for example, payment or discharge in bankruptcy. 62 Similarly, if a person alleges that a state official deprived him of a constitutional right, the official will have to plead and prove good faith conduct in her actions because the official has peculiar knowledge of her conduct that is the basis of the plaintiff's claim. 63 Additionally, courts often estimate the probabilities of the occurrence of a situation or event in order to allocate the burden. 64 The court will normally assign the burden to the party whose case depends on the occurrence of the more unusual event. 65 For example, because 59. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4) (1992) . In addition, the applicant seeking a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit "always bears the burden of persuading the Agency that a permit authorizing pollutants to be discharged should be issued and not denied.
This burden does not shift." 40 C.F.R. § 124.85(a)(l) (1992); see also Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 629 n.49 (10th Cir. 1990) (reading the NPDES permit regulations to say "it is the proponent of a permit who bears the burden of showing that a discharge will comply with all applicable standards, not the opponent of a permit who must show that a discharge will violate applicable requirements").
60. Commentators have discounted three tests traditionally utilized by courts because they provide little guidance in the allocation decision. First, the court may allocate the burden of proof to the party who must establish the affirmative proposition on the issue. However, a party may cast any issue as either a negative or affirmative proposition. For example, in a negligence case the defendant might argue that she acted with care while the plaintiff contends that the defendant acted negligently. Second, courts often place the burden on the party to whose case the issue is essential. But to whom is the fact most essential? In any given case the positive or negative of the fact may be equally important to each party. Finally, the burden of proof is often allocated to the party with the burden of pleading the issue. The same problems in determining the allocation of the burden of persuasion may arise with respect to the burden of pleading. The court simply examines the factors determining the allocation at an earlier point in the proceed- Unit A Jan. 1981) (allocating the burden of proof to the party contending that the event occurred because it was not logical -that is, not probable -that the asserted event took place); Fire-the gratuitous performance of services in a business setting is unlikely, the party asserting the existence of free services should bear the burden of proof to rebut a contract claim. 66 To determine a situation's probabilities the court could examine how often the situation occurs as a part of everyday life. Under a more exacting approach the court would consider past judicial experience with particular contentions by determining how often parties making an unusual claim have succeeded in proving the contention in court. 67 A court may also consider which party desires a change in the status quo. Because the plaintiff brings a case to change the present state of affairs, that party generally bears the burden of proof. 68 For example, the tort plaintiff who seeks to enjoin the defendant from continuing to behave in a way that causes the plaintiff injury should bear the risk of failing to persuade the judge or jury because she desires to change the status quo. 69 This reasoning, however, presupposes a preference for the status quo over change. In some situations, particularly in suits to enjoin a disfavored activity, public policy considerations may embrace change rather than the current state of affairs. 70 To determine whether public policy embraces change, courts should turn to the final factor: examining the policy of the underlying substantive law.
Courts often do not hesitate to allocate the burden to realize the purposes of the substantive law and to promote public policy goals. 71 man's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317 , 1328 (E.D. Mich. 1988 ) {placing burden on insurance policyholders who contend that they come within the "sudden and accidental" exception to a pollution exclusion clause because they are arguing that the more unusual event occurred); In re Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc., 130 B.R. 119, 121-22 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1991); cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988) (relying, in part, on "common sense and probability" to uphold presumption of investor reliance on public material misrepresentations based on fraud-on-the-market theory); International Bhd. Accordingly, when the legislative intent disapproves of certain claims or defenses, 72 courts should allocate the burden to the party advancing the disfavored claim or defense in order to uphold the approved policy of the law. For example, to uphold the Bankruptcy Act's congressional policy of giving the debtor a fresh start, creditors must bear the burden of proving the disfavored claim that a debt is excepted from discharge under bankruptcy.73 As the Supreme Court has stated, ultimately " [t] here are no hardand-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations.' " 74 Thus, the factors listed above offer significant discretion to courts to make the allocation, but courts will likely pay particular attention to the policy and fairness issues implicated by the allocation.
B. Burdens of Production and Persuasion
Courts and commentators typically bifurcate the burden of proof into the burden of going forward with evidence, or production, and the burden of persuasion. 75 Ordinarily, the burdens of production and persuasion attach to the party that has the burden of pleading a certain claim or defense. 76 Occasionally, however, the court may shift either one or both of the burdens. The plaintiff may have the burden of producing evidence regarding the claim, but, once the plaintiff has met an initial burden -for example, establishing a prima facie case 77 -the ultimate burden of persuasion may rest with the defendant. For 72. The disfavored claim or defense could presumably be one that is upholding a status quo that the legislature wishes to change. Put differently, Congress, in enacting certain legislation, could be seen as putting its imprimatur on a new vision of the status quo. Those parties opposing this new status quo should bear the burden of proof. 77. A prima facie case in this sense means that the plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to go to the jury. In other words, the party is no longer liable to a nonsuit or to a directed verdict for the party's opponent. 14 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 55, § 2491. In contrast, Black's Law Dictionary defines a prima facie case as one in which the submission of evidence by example, in cases determining whether the National Environmental Protection Act requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), courts have adopted a burden-shifting rule. The party challenging an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS must first demonstrate that the proposed project would have a substantial environmental impact. The burden then shifts to the federal agency, which must prove that its decision not to prepare an EIS was reasonable. 78 Courts have employed burden-shifting rules for different reasons.
For example, in Welsh v. United States, 79 a federal circuit court employed such a rule because the defendant had easier access to evidence than the plaintiff. In James v. River Parishes Co., 80 the court allocated the burden of disproving negligence to the defendant due to probability considerations. In other cases, courts have shifted burdens because of policy concems. 81 In evaluating the allocation of the burden of proof under the consistency provision of the CZMA, a court should consider the different considerations discussed in section II.A. Moreover, as section II.B reveals, a court may allocate an initial burden to one party and subsequently shift the burden of persuasion to the other to achieve a proper balance among the different considerations.
III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE CZMA CONSISTENCY PROVISION
Courts that have allocated the burden of proof under the CZMA consistency provision have done so in a cursory manner and relied on one party leads to a certain decision unless the other party rebuts the evidence. BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1983).
78. In Missouri Coalition for the Envt. v. Corps of Engrs., 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989) , the court stated:
The initial burden of proof is upon the challenging party to demonstrate that there were facts omitted from the administrative record which, if true, would show that the permitted project could have a substantial impact on the environment. If such facts are established, and they are of sufficient significance to warrant shifting the burden of proof, the agency must then demonstrate that its negative determination was reasonable under the circumstances. This Part applies each of the factors traditionally utilized by courts in allocating the burden of proof in other contexts 84 to the question of consistency raised under section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA. Section III.A evaluates the guidance on the allocation issue arising from the language, the implementing regulations, and the legislative history of the CZMA and the 1990 amendments. This section concludes that these sources suggest, but do not mandate, that the burden should lie with the state. Finding no clear congressional intent regarding the allocation of the burden of proof, however, this Part next considers the other factors courts utilize in allocating burdens. Section III.B examines two traditional factors for allocating the burden -access to evidence and probabilities -and finds them unhelpful in this instance. Section III.C evaluates the policy behind the statute, including how changing perspectives of the status quo of coastal development affected that policy, and concludes that the federal agency should bear the burden of persuasion regarding a federal activity's consistency.
F.2d at 1032 (citations omitted); see also
A. Language, Regulations, and Legislative History
When a court turns to the CZMA's language, regulations, and legislative history, it will find meager guidance for resolving the allocation issue. Nevertheless, these sources indicate that Congress may have sought to limit the coastal states' ability under the CZMA to prevent a federal activity from proceeding. This indication, in turn, may affect the decision of who should bear the burden of proof.
Section III.A.1 examines the single explicit statement regarding the allocation of the burden of proof that occurs in the language, regulations, or legislative history of the CZMA. The statement, made by a single congressman during floor debates, does not provide significant guidance to the decision but does reflect a concern that may indirectly affect the allocation issue. The statement suggests that the state should bear the burden of proof to avoid giving states a practical veto power over federal decisions to conduct certain activities. 85 82. 777 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (E.D. La. 1991 84. See supra section II.A. 85. Members of Congress, judges, and commentators refer to limits to state control in terms of avoiding a "state veto" of federal activities .. In this context, a state veto is not an official veto power granted by the CZMA, but a state's practical ability to block a federal activity through the Section III.A.2 examines the veto concern raised by the legislator's statement introduced in section III.A. I. The objective of avoiding the grant of a state veto power indicates that Congress did not intend the CZMA to allow a state to halt a federal activity unilaterally by declaring the activity inconsistent with the state CMP. This section examines the ways the CZMA avoids granting a state veto power and concludes that mechanisms other than placing the burden of proof on the state -such as placing the final authority to make a consistency determination with the federal agency -adequately address the concern over state veto power.
Section III.A.3 examines the ramifications on the burden of proof allocation decision arising when the federal agency has the final authority to make the consistency determination. Normally, an agency making a determination under the delegated authority of the lawsuch as a finding of fact -need not persuade the court that its determination is correct. Thus, courts may justifiably defer to some extent to the federal agency's final CZMA consistency determination and may, as a result, place the burden of proof on the state contesting it. Nevertheless, as this section concludes, certain unique features of the CZMA suggest that courts do not owe the "final" federal decision deference and in fact may owe state coastal agencies deference. Thus, courts should not allocate the burden of proof to the state on this ground.
Explicit Statements in the Language, Regulations, and Legislative History
The language and implementing regulations provide no explicit allocation of the burden of proof. Moreover, only one statement in the CZMA's legislative history mentions the burden of proof; during the House floor debates on the 1990 amendments, Representative Leon Panetta stated that: First, this bill will not give States a veto power over Federal agency activities. Even if a State disagreed with a Federal agency activity, the activity would go forward unless the parties agreed to submit to mediation by the Secretary of Commerce or unless the State succeeded in persuading a court to overturn the Federal agency's action. 86 Although revealing his view that the state bears the burden of proof, Panetta's statement is hardly dispositive, and only slightly persuasive, regarding congressional intent on this issue. As a general rule of statutory construction, the statements of a single legislator should exercise of its role under the Act. Because one may argue that the state should bear the burden of proof to avoid a state veto, this section addresses the state-veto issue.
86. 136 CONG. REC. H8081 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Panetta) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 92:438 not control the courf s interpretation of legislative intent. 87 In addition, Panetta's statement only indirectly relates to the allocation of the burden of proof; his statement is primarily concerned with pointing out that the CZMA stops short of granting coastal states an absolute veto power over federal activities. Other statements regarding congressional intent, discussed in the next section, show that allocation of the burden of proof to states is unnecessary to avoid state veto power.
Avoiding State Veto Power Over Federal Activities
Most observers conclude that section 307(c)(l) does not provide the states with a veto power over federal activities. 88 When addressing the state veto power concern, legislators and courts speak of the state's practical power to halt a federal activity unilaterally by declaring it inconsistent with the state CMP. 8 9 The "veto concern" thus serves as shorthand for discussing the limits of state control and influence granted in the CZMA over federal activities. 90 Legislators and courts have discussed four ways in which the CZMA may avoid granting a practical veto power to the states. Each method recognizes a different degree of control that the states may exercise under the CZMA. These methods include allocating to the state the burden of persuading a court that the activity is inconsistent; giving the final authority to make the consistency determination, prior to litigation, to the federal agency; limiting the circumstances in which the federal agency must comply with the state CMP; or providing the Though I reject the notion that Congress intended to give the states an absolute "veto power" over federal action in the coastal zone, I believe it is manifest from the fact of the statute that Congress did intend to cede some authority in matters of coastal development to the affected states in order to achieve cooperative and coordinated development of scarce natural resources. 560 F. Supp. at 576.
executive branch an override ability to reverse judgments that favor states to the detriment of the national interest.
Representative Panetta is the only individual who has pointed to the assignment of the burden of proof to the states as necessary to avoid a state veto. In Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 91 the Massachusetts District Court reached a contrary conclusion. The court did not find that placing the burden of proving consistency on the federal agency would give the states a veto power. 92
The Ninth Circuit, in California v. Watt, 93 discussed the second way the CZMA avoids a state veto. The court determined that vetopower concerns mandated that the federal agency have the final authority to make a consistency determination. 94 In other words, a state disagreement with a federal consistency determination does not halt the federal activity because the federal activity may proceed over a state objection unless the state seeks mediation or sues to prevent the activity from progressing. By comparison, if the state did possess the ability to halt the federal activity by objecting to the consistency determination, the federal agency would have to seek administrative or judicial permission to proceed with the activity, a result that has not occurred in practice.9 5 The veto concern thus implicates the question of who has to pursue mediation or judicial review, rather than who bears the burden of proof once the party has proceeded to court.
Representative Walter B. Jones, a cosponsor of the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, raised the final two ways in which a state veto may be avoided. He stated that section 307(c)(l):
will not result in the veto of vital national projects or activities. This is true for two reasons. First, agency activities under section 307(c)(l) must be consistent "to the maximum extent practicable." Under existing Department of Commerce regulations this means that an agency must be fully consistent where that [a]gency has discretion; however, where the [a]gency is acting subject to a nondiscretionary statutory duty, full con- 94. After noting that "[t]he Act is not explicit with respect to the location of final authority to determine whether the required consistency exists," the court proceeded to hold that the federal agency must possess final authority; otherwise the interests of the nation would play second fiddle to state interests. 683 F.2d at 1264. The Supreme Court declined to decide this issue upon appeal, noting that "[i]n view of our conclusion that a lease sale is not subject to § 307(c)(l)'s consistency review requirements, we need not decide who holds final authority to determine when sufficient consistency has been achieved. This provision prevents a state veto 100 because the state cannot unilaterally stop the federal activity through section 307(c)(l). The different methods that allay the threat of a state veto leave the state with different levels of control over the federal agencies and over the state's coastal zone. At one end, allowing the agency to proceed with an activity over a state objection, unless the state seeks mediation or proves to a court that the activity is inconsistent, envisions limited state influence. At the other end, allowing the agency to proceed after a state objection only if the President overrides a judicial decision in the state's favor envisions substantial state infiuence. 101 To determine the appropriate level of control, and thus an appropriate method to avoid a state veto, 'One must have a better understanding of how much state control Congress intended the CZMA to give to the states.
As explained in section III.C.2, the CZMA's overarching policy is to give coastal states primary control of the coastal zone. Thus, the last two methods should reflect the appropriate level of state control and should provide ample protection from states that would exert unchecked authority over federal activities. Allocating the burden of proof to the state or granting to the federal agency the final authority 96. 136 CONG. REc. E543 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones). 97. To be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with a state's CMP, the activity must be "fully consistent with such programs unless compliance is prohibited based upon the requirements of existing Jaw applicable to the Federal agency's operations." 15 C.F.R. § 930.32 (1991).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(B) (Supp. 1991 to make a consistency determination is unnecessary to avoid a state veto power. Nevertheless, because parties to consistency disputes have conceded, 102 and courts have agreed, 103 that federal agencies make the final prelitigation consistency determination, it is necessary to consider how the federal agency's final consistency authority affects the allocation of the burden of proof.
The Final Prelitigation Determination of Consistency
Placing the burden of proof on the agency to justify its decision would seem to contradict the mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). 104 When the state challenges a federal agency's consistency determination in a federal court, the court will likely consider what level of deference to give the agency decision. Because the CZMA provides no standard for judicial review, the AP A governs agency actions under the CZMA. Pursuant to the AP A, a court will generally defer to an agency decision clearly within the agency's statutory authority, particularly on a factual issue. 1 0 5
The court for the District of Louisiana so held. In Louisiana v. Lujan, 106 the state sought a preliminary injunction against the Department of the Interior's plans to lease offshore oil and gas exploration and development rights. The state disagreed with the Department of the Interior's consistency determination and contended that this activity was inconsistent with the state CMP. The court determined that the plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of success on the merits because they could not prove that the federal agency's consistency determination was arbitrary or otherwise not in accordance with law. 107 The court confined its review to determining whether the agency had provided sufficient information to support its determination and thus rejected the state's contention that the federal agency should bear the Because the CZMA presents a unique situation calling for abandonment of standard deference to a federal agency consistency determination, this Note contends that the decision in Louisiana v. Lujan was poorly reasoned. The judiciary traditionally defers to an agency decision because Congress delegated authority to an agency to implement and enforce a particular statute and the agency has expertise in the particular field. 109 Under the CZMA, however, Congress did not grant any new authority to federal agencies. Instead, Congress mandated that federal agencies must act in a manner consistent with state CMPs. 110 Thus, the CZMA arguably restricts agency authority, rather than granting new authority. Moreover, Congress has indicated that the state agency overseeing the state CMP, not the federal agency, possesses the expertise in local coastal management. 111 Finally, because different federal agencies will need to conduct consistency determinations, courts may achieve uniform interpretation and application of a state's CMP only by deferring to the single state view regarding its coastal program. Because the traditional reasons justifying deference to federal agencies do not obtain, no deference should be given to the federal agency under the CZMA.1 12 Indeed, the same reasons calling for no deference to federal agencies under the act suggest granting deference to the state agency overseeing the state CMP. 113 In summary, the language, regulations, and legislative history of 936 (1990) , the court stated: "When the agency is the addressee of the statutory command, it takes the leading role in giving structure to the statute .•.. When two agencies claim to be the addressees, though, this allocation breaks down." 883 F.2d at 547 (emphasis added). In such a case, "a court could say that because the agencies disagree, neither is entitled to deference." 883 F.2d at 547.
113. Some courts facing two agencies offering competing findings or interpretations have determined which agency deserves deference by examining the statute delegating authority. In Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commn., 499 U.S. 144 (1991), the Supreme Court examined the regulatory structure of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to determine whether courts should defer to the opinion of the Secretary of Labor or the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission regarding the meaning of OSHA. The Court inferred from the structure and history of the Act that, because the Secretary was "to develop the expertise relevant to assessing the effect of a particular regulatory interpretation," Congress had "intended to invest interpretive power" in the Secretary of Labor. 499 U.S. at 152-53. As this Note explains in section III.C.2.a, the CZMA intended to place the state, and thus the state agency, in a position of control over the coastal zone. Thus, under Martin, the court should defer to the state agency.
the CZMA do not allocate the burden of proof. In addition, the veto concern raised by legislators and courts interpreting the CZMA may suggest that the federal agency should possess final authority to make a consistency determination, but the veto concern does not mandate placing the burden of proof on the state because other mechanisms avoid a state veto power. Finally, placing the final authority to make a consistency determination with the federal agencies does not require -as the AP A might suggest -that the courts defer to the federal agency's determination by placing the burden of proof on the states to show the determination was arbitrary or capricious.
Because these textual sources do not provide clear guidance for resolving the allocation question, this Note next addresses other factors courts utilize to allocate burdens of proof.
B. Access to Evidence and Probabilities
Neither the federal agency nor the state has a clear advantage in access to evidence necessary for adjudicating a consistency dispute. The federal agency initially has superior access to evidence because it possesses the information regarding its own project that the determination re·quires. When provided to the state, the consistency determination gives the state the germane information as well. 114 In addition, a federal activity affecting the coastal zone would likely require the federal agency to prepare a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act. 115 An EIS, which would be available to the state, includes extensive information about environmental conditions in the affected area, thus further equalizing the access to knowledge of the federal activity. 116 An example of a dispute illustrates why each party has roughly equivalent access to important information. 117 Assume the Department of Interior provides a consistency determination for an offshore oil tract leasing program. The consistency determination would contain "a detailed description of the activity, its associated facilities, and their coastal zone effects, and comprehensive data and information sufficient to support the Federal agency's consistency statement. Supp. 1990) ). Section 102 of NEPA requires agencies to consider environmental factors and consequences by requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement whenever an agency proposes "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988 The factor that maintains that the burden of proof should be assigned to the party seeking to establish the improbable 119 also provides little guidance; parties and courts have had too little experience with consistency disputes to be able to establish whether consistency or inconsistency is the improbable contention. The types of disputes that arise with respect to the consistency determination occur infrequently.120 Moreover, only one case has reached the merits to determine whether an activity was consistent with a state CMP. 121 Therefore, little data is available for judges to determine whether a contention is unusual.
In summary, neither the "access to evidence" nor "probability" tests help resolve the issue of allocating the burden of proof.
C. CZMA Policy Review
Because other factors fail to provide definitive guidance concerning the burden of proof allocation, courts should evaluate the policies un- derlying the CZMA to illuminate the allocation decision. 122 Two themes arise from an examination of the language and legislative history of the Act. First, the Act balances development and use of the coastal zone 123 against preservation concerns. Second, the CZMA balances federal and state control in managing the coastal zone. Both themes are critical to an understanding of the consistency provision and to allocating the burden of proof. This section analyzes each theme first by examining the original policy of the CZMA, the congressional reaffirmation of the original policy in the 1990 amendments, and judicial decisions construing the policy, and, second, by considering how each theme guides the allocation decision. a. Policy review: 1972 Act, 1990 Amendments, and judicial decisions. In the congressional findings of the 1972 Act, Congress noted that the fundamental need for the CZMA arises from the "national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the coastal zone." 124 This statement indicates that the Act is foremost a balancing scheme; Congress sought to accommodate a number of competing concerns to ensure optimal use of the coastal zone resources. Examination of additional findings and legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended the balance to favor protection.
Balancing Preservation and Development Interests
During consideration of coastal zone legislation, Congress learned of the danger the growing population of the U.S. coast posed to this resource. 125 By the mid-1950s, development pressures on the coast had destroyed twenty-five percent of the nation's coastal wetlands. 126 Increasing recreational and commercial demands endangered biological organisms, and the deteriorating coastal water and wetlands quality threatened fish spawning grounds and nursery areas. 127 128. In pertinent part, the congressional findings stated: (c) The increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone [Vol. 92:438 In addition to the political pressures these physical realities created, a large and increasingly organized preservationist constituency influenced passage of the Act. During the 1960s, membership in the environmental movement grew rapidly. 129 As one commentator noted, "the cumulative impact of scientific and poetic insights . . . made ecology an everyday word, helped to elevate environmental protection to political respectability, and contributed to the eventual adoption of the Coastal Zone Management Act." 130 On the other hand, prodevelopment interests also exercised leverage over the passage of the Act. The influential "Stratton Report" 131 favored resource development, stating:
the key to more effective use of our coastland is the introduction of a management system permitting conscious and informed choices among development alternatives, providing for proper planning, and encouraging recognition of the long-term importance of maintaining the quality of this productive region in order to ensure both its enjoyment and the sound utilization of its resources. 13 2
The CZMA addressed development concerns in several ways. First, Congress weakened the mandate of the Act by making state participation optional. 1 3 3 Second, Congress assigned the program to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the oversight of the business-oriented Department of Commerce. 134 Third, the Act did not set substantive environmental performance standards. 135 occasioned by population growth and economic development •.
• have resulted in the loss of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and adverse changes to ecological systems, decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion. (d) The habitat areas of the coastal zone, and the fish, shellfish, other living marine resources, and wildlife therein, are ecologically fragile and consequently extremely vulnerable to destruction by man's alterations. (e) Important ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values in the coastal zone which are essential to the well-being of all citizens are being irretrievably damaged or lost.
(g) Special natural and scenic characteristics are being damaged by ill-planned development that threatens these values.
16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988 & Supp. II 1990 Instead of emphasizing such performance requirements, Congress designed the Act primarily to create a management scheme to control various coastal zone uses. 136 Finally, Congress required states seeking approval of a CMP to show that they had considered the national interest "in the siting of facilities . . . necessary to meet requirements which are other than local in nature." 137 Although prodevelopment interests exerted some influence, Congress did not lose sight of the fact that ill-managed development and recreation had led to unimpeded degradation of the coastal zone. 138 The CZMA sought to change this status quo of unchecked harmful coastal activity by emphasizing effective state management of coastal activities. Congress also specifically called for the inclusion of procedures for designating specific areas "for the purpose of preserving or restoring them for their conservation . . . ecological . . . or esthetic values." 139 In the 1990 Amendments, Congress endorsed the original preservation policy of the Act: the "CZMA should continue to be a balancing statute which recognizes alternative uses of coastal zone resources, but at the same time ... all uses should be sensitive to the priority for maintaining natural systems in the coastal zone." 140 The amended congressional findings underscored the coastal zone's fragile nature and susceptibility to human infiuence. 141 Additionally, Congress added a section to the CZMA's policy declaration to reflect the environmental-protection orientation of the legislation. The new section expressly declares that state CMPs must incorporate provisions to im-"Act is more procedural in nature, requiring that states make 'conscious and informal choices among various alternatives' through the development of coastal zone management programs" (quoting S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1972) , reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4781)), revd. in part sub nom. Save Our Dunes v. Alabama Dept. ofEnvtl. Mgmt., 834 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1987) . Although the CZMA allows each state to tailor its own CMP to meet particular state needs, the Act sets some minimum content standards including "identification of the boundaries of the coastal zone subject to the [CMP] Siting, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 568 (1980) ; supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
See Randele Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regulation of Coastal Energy Facility
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(9) (Supp. IV 1992) . For an explanation of approval requirements for Coastal Management Plans, of which this condition is a part, see also infra notes 161-62.
140. 136 CONG. REC. H8073 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones) (emphasis added).
141. Section 145l(d) states: "[t]he habitat areas of the coastal zone, and the fish, shellfish, other living marine resources, and wildlife therein, are ecologically fragile and consequently extremely vulnerable to destruction by man's alterations." 16 U.S.C. § 145l(d) (Supp. IV 1992) . (Vol. 92:438 prove, safeguard, and restore the quality of coastal waters, and to protect natural resources and existing uses of those waters.1 42
The few courts that have interpreted the CZMA have generally emphasized the preservation goals of the Act. In American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 143 the court for the Central District of California denied the plaintiff oil trade association's suit to enjoin the grant of "final approval" of the California Coastal Zone Management Program. The court stated:
The CZMA was enacted primarily with a view to encouraging the coastal states to plan for the management, development, preservation, and restoration of their coastal zones by establishing rational processes by which to regulate uses therein. Although sensitive to balancing competing interests, it was first and foremost a statute directed to and solicitous of environmental concems. 144 In California v. Watt, 145 the District Court for the Central District of California enjoined the Department of Interior from conducting lease sales of OCS tracts off the California coast. The court supported its holding by referring to the purposes of the Act: "Special emphasis was placed on the objective of preserving the natural resources" within the coastal zone. 146 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the consistency provision should be broadly construed to comply with the purposes of the Act, including "promot[ing] the preservation of natural resources in the coastal zone."147
The CZMA plays primarily a protection role for the U.S. coastal 142. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1992) . In addition to general statements emphasizing the increasing need for protection of the coastal zone, the congressional conference concluded that specific coastal environmental threats included the insidious problems of nonpoint pollution and greenhouse warming that could lead to frequent coastal flooding. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 793 (4th Cir. 1988 ) (the CZMA was "designed to encourage states to develop land-use planning programs that will preserve, protect, and restore the environment of their coastal zones").
resources. Courts should recognize this protection-oriented balance in making burden of proof allocation decisions.
b. Implications for the allocation decision. Effectuating Congress's preservation goal requires federal agencies to bear the burden of proof in any disputes arising over a section 307(c)(l) consistency determination. 148 An examination of how courts allocated the risk of nonpersuasion during the unabashed prodevelopment period preceding the enactment of the CZMA, and how the courts modified burden allocation after the beginning of the environmental era, underscores this conclusion. 149 When the courts interpreted law to sanction industrial progress at the expense of resource protection, a plaintiff seeking to enjoin or limit a development activity, typically on a nuisance theory, had to overcome the prodevelopment status quo to succeed. 150 Accordingly, the plaintiff would bear the burden of proof. Prior to the "environmental era" courts and litigants accepted this situation.
In the 1960s and 1970s, increased environmental consciousness led Congress's preferences away from seeking unimpeded development and toward recognizing the dangers of pollution and depletion of natural resources. 151 The status quo became one in which development interests had to account for the adverse environmental effects of their activities; the new status quo valued guardianship over the nation's natural resources. 152 Furthermore, statutes suggested that those pursuing unchecked progress advanced a disfavored proposition. 153 Thus, parties seeking to conduct developmental activities had to show that 148. This contention assumes that f~eral agencies conduct development-oriented activities.
Disputes have not arisen when the state, under the auspices of the CZMA, calls into question protection-oriented federal activities. If such a dispute were to arise, the courts would have to balance the proprotection aspects of the Act with the state-control aspects. See infra section 111.C.2. Congress apparently intended the CZMA primarily as a proprotection Act that grants states control over the coastal zone, rather than a state-control statute that happens to take protection concerns into account. The legislative history indicates that Congress grappled with a number of options to protect coastal resources, including a federal land-use act, but finally settled on vesting primary responsibility with the states. See Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31; infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text. Therefore, a state should bear the burden of proving that a proprotection federal activity is inconsistent with the state CMP. Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1984) ; Krier, supra note 26, at 107. Belsky discusses three eras of environmental law with different allocations of burdens of proof: in the years preceding the 1960s, the burden of proof rested with those who sought to inhibit development; in the 1960s and 1970s an environmental era developed resulting in several statutes that shifted the burden to those utilizing or polluting natural resources; and in the 1980s there was a shift back to prodevelopment interests and a resulting movement of the burden of proof onto those seeking protection of natural resources. Belsky, supra.
Cf. Martin H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the Burden of
150 § § 1251-1376 (1982) ).
[Vol. 92:438 they had accounted for environmental effects. 15 4 The CZMA extended this policy to the management of coastal resources; the 1990 amendments to the CZMA reaffirmed this policy. Courts should acknowledge Congress's perception of the status quo as one in which states shall protect the coastal zone, and courts should recognize that those who seek to develop the coastal zone pursue an activity disfavored by the CZMA's policy. Consequently, because the federal agency seeking to exploit undeveloped coastal resources counters the status quo and opposes the CZMA's primary preservation goal, it should bear the burden of proof. State and Federal Control a. Policy review: 1972 Act, 1990Amendments, and judicial decisions. Although Congress propounded an environmental protection goal in the 1972 Act, it intended to give primary responsibility to the states to make the specific decisions regarding protection. 155 Congress determined that state control, rather than a national regulatory scheme, would best effectuate the purposes of the Act. Because of the national interest in coastal management, however, Congress determined that some federal input was necessary.
Balancing
Prior to the Act, national, state, and local political bodies exercised varying degrees of control over the coastal zone with considerable dominion lying with local jurisdictions. 156 Congress found this joint exercise of authority "too diffuse in focus, neglected in importance and inadequate in the regulatory authority needed to do the job." 157 The Act sought to remedy these inadequacies by "adopt[ing] the States as the focal point for developing comprehensive plans and implementing management programs for the coastal zone." 158 Congress viewed the 154. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 629 n.49 (10th Cir. 1990 ). 155. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) states the policy objective as: to encourage and assist the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development and implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone, giving full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well as to needs for economic development .... See also S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972 ), reprinted in 1972 ("The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over their coastal zones.").
156. Congress found "the coastal zone is a politically complex area, involving local, state, regional, national, and international political interests. At present, local governments do possess considerable authority in the coastal zone. However, frequently their jurisdiction does not extend far enough to deal fully and effectively with the ... problems of that zone." S. REP. No. 753, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972 ), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4779. 157. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972 76 (1970) (finding that "the Coastal and Great Lakes States are the keys to successful estuary preservation and restoration"); STRATTON REPORT, supra note 131, at 56 (indicating that the states should be "the focus of responsibility and action" in a coastal management system).
159. Local authorities were denied exclusive control because the local governmental bodies were too beholden to economic influences. See S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972 ), reprinted in 1972 160. The application of states' CMPs on a case-by-case basis "provides a reasonable framework for decision making, given the breadth of the geographic area covered by state coastal programs and the complexity and number of factors that need to be taken into consideration." Robert W. Knecht, Coastal Zone Management: The First Five Years and Beyond, 6 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 259, 265 (1979 REV. 115, 117 (1988) .
161. The Act states: Prior to granting approval of a management program submitted by a coastal state, the Secretary shall find that: (l) The state has developed and adopted a management program for its coastal zone in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary, after notice, and with the opportunity of full participation by relevant Federal agencies, state agencies, local governments, regional organizations, port authorities, and other interested parties, public and private, which is adequate to carry out the purposes of this chapter .... 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1988) , amended by 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (Supp. IV 1992) . REP. No. 1049 , 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972 , reprinted in SEN-ATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972 , at 321 (Comm. Print 1976 f the program as developed is to be approved and thereby enable the State to receive funding assistance under this title, the State must take into account and must accommodate its program to the specific requirements of various Federal laws which are applicable to its coastal zone.").
[ Vol. 92:438 CMP considers the national interest in siting energy facilities on the coast. 162 In addition, after approval of a CMP, the Secretary of Commerce may review the CMP and the performance of the state. 1 6 3 If the state does not adhere to the approved program, the Secretary may terminate financial assistance granted to the state under section 306 of the CZMA. 164 Aside from this limited federal control, the state is free to regulate its coastal areas as it wishes.
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress reaffirmed the original policy of the Act to vest control of the coastal zone with the states. Congress emphasized that the increasing stress placed on the coastal zone was "creating the need for resolution of serious conflicts among important and competing uses and values in coastal and ocean waters." 165 Although Congress indicated it favored protection of the coastal zone over development of this resource, 166 it did not attempt directly to resolve the "conflicts" within the CZMA. Rather, Congress entrusted to the coastal states the role of resolving specific conflicts due to their proximity to and economic reliance upon the coastal zone. 167 Additionally, the adoption of new provisions in the 1990 Amendments to assist and guide states in conducting effective management programs supports the conclusion that Congress intended coastal states to play the primary role in coastal zone management. The amendments provide funds for administration of management plans, 168 grant additional CMP development funds to promote state participation, 169 167. The Act states: Because of their proximity to and reliance upon the ocean and its resources, the coastal states have substantial and significant interests in the protection, management, and development of the resources of the exclusive economic zone that can only be served by the active participation of coastal states in all Federal programs affecting such resources and, wherever appropriate, by development of state ocean resource plans as part of their federally approved coastal zone management programs. 16 U.S.C. § 145l{m) (Supp. IV 1992) .
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (Supp. IV 1992) . 169. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (Supp. IV 1992) . 170. 16 U.S.C. § 1456{b) (Supp. IV 1992) . The areas of national interest included protecting and managing coastal wetlands, managing natural hazards such as sea level rise, improving public access to the coast, assessing the impacts of coastal growth and development, and siting of coastal energy facilities in an environmentally sound manner. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (Supp. IV 1992) .
The amended consistency provision also establishes Congress's intent to vest control over the coastal zone in the states. The Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 171 by removing a large class of federal activities from consistency review, restricted states' ability vis-a-vis federal activities to protect and manage the coastal zone. 172 Congress responded to this restriction by indicating clearly that federal activities affecting the coastal zone are subject to the requirements of state CMPs. As stated in the conference report accompanying the new legislation, the provision amends the "federa1 consistency" provisions to overturn the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California. This would clarify that a11 federa1 agency activities, whether in or outside of the coasta1 zone, are subject to the consistency requirements of section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA if they affect natura1 resources, land uses, or water uses in the coasta1 zone. 173 Thus, a federal agency would no longer easily subvert a state's control over the coastal zone by claiming that the federal activity fell outside the purview of the consistency provision.
Statements by supporters of the House bill further demonstrate that the new consistency provision served to reassert the states' key position under the Act. As stated by Representative Hertel, cosponsor of the House bill, "any Federal agency activity in the coastal zone is subject to consistency review, as long as that activity can conceivably have an effect on the coastal zone. This includes OCS lease sales and any other Federal activity that may have an effect on the coastal zone." 174 [ Vol. 92:438 that is, the costs-borne by coastal states when development projects affect coastal areas. Indeed, as Studds suggests, although the federal agencies may understand the benefits of the activities from a national perspective, they are apt to ignore or underestimate the local costs. Requiring the federal agencies to consider state CMPs through the consistency provisions forces agencies to consider local costs.
Courts also have recognized the Act's focus on state control over coastal areas. In American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 177 the District Court for the Central District of California explained that "the primary focus of the legislation [is] the need for a rational planning process to enable the state ... to be able to make 'hard choices. ' " 178 The court recognized that Congress considered the states best suited to make the difficult balancing decisions between developing and protecting the coast.
In The CZMA gives states the primary role in managing the coastal zone. Courts should recognize this state-control balance in making burden of proof allocation decisions.
b. Implications for the allocation decision. To further Congress's policy of vesting control over the coastal zone with the states, federal agencies should bear the burden of proof in consistency disputes. This section first explains that this solution would accord appropriate respect to the value judgments the CZMA requires states to make. It then demonstrates that the solution would not hinder federal interests in the coastal zone because such interests are protected during the approval stage of states' CMPs, and, in certain instances, through a presidential override of state interests.
Congress supported the idea of protecting the coastal zone but placed the specific case-by-case management of development versus protection conflicts in the hands of the ·state governments. 183 The states are to manage the coastal zone to protect their resources and to allow for development. 184 Obviously these demands on the coastal zone might conflict, 185 thus requiring the states to decide between the competing merits of protecting or exploiting the coastal zone. But, as long as state management plans meet minimum standards for approval, 186 the states have significant discretion to balance the conflicting claims on the coast.
Under the CZMA scheme, states measure the costs and benefits of coastal protection against the costs and benefits of activities that threaten the coast. 187 States have discretion to decide how much their citizens value preserving pristine coastal areas for future generations, confining residential development to areas removed from the beach, or mandating consideration of alternative energy sources in lieu of offshore oil drilling in certain tracts. The states may also determine costs incurred in protecting the coast, such as the costs of forgoing economic development. Because it is difficult to quantify many costs and benefits in monetary terms, 188 the state may make conceptual value 183. Certainly, Congress weighted the scale it gave to the states-that is, the CMP approval guidelines-in favor of consideration of protection of the coastal resource. Thus, Congress ensured that its own interest in protection was considered. 16 U.S.C. § § 1455(d)(9)-(ll) (1990 187. One may view Congress's mandate to the states to formulate coastal plans in a slightly different way. Congress enacted coastal zone legislation because of the risks posed by unimpeded development, yet Congress did not assess the risks involved. Instead, Congress may have decided that states were better able to make judgments regarding the relevant risks along their coastal zones. If a state perceives a greater risk from nondevelopment than might the federal government, then the state would incorporate this judgment into a more lenient CMP. If the risk to the environment appears as a greater threat than the risks of nondevelopment, then the state would adopt a more stringent CMP.
188. EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COs-r ANALYSIS 4 (1990).
[ Vol. 92:438 judgments. For instance, a state may find it difficult to quantify the local costs of accepting the risk of an oil spill from offshore development. Thus, the state may determine simply that its citizens place a high value on minimizing the risk of such oil spills but also value the benefits of energy development. To reconcile these competing values, the state may place certain risk-minimizing restrictions on offshore oil production to allow safer energy development.1 8 9 Different states may strike different balances between protection and development when they incorporate their value judgments into CMPs. 19° Congress both expects and desires this result; one purpose of the CZMA is to allow the cost-benefit analyses to reflect the difference in circumstances between the coastal states. 191 Once states incorporate these diverse judgments into CMPs, the consistency provisions ensure that the federal government respects them.
The consistency requirement forces federal agencies to consider costs federal activities impose on states, as recognized by state CMPs. 192 States largely, if not exclusively, bear the costs of certain federal government activities affecting the coastal zone. 193 States identify these costs in the process of formulating and seeking approval of CMPs. 194 In contrast, the nation often receives a larger portion of the benefits from the exploitation of the coastal zone, especially with respect to energy production that benefits the nation by lessening dependence on foreign sources. 195 In such cases, federal agencies will tend to favor national benefits to the detriment of local interests.
Because state CMPs have encoded the states' consideration of development costs, courts should not force further justification of this assessment. Rather, courts should require the federal agency to show that the benefits of the activity in question outweigh the costs as expressed in the CMP. 196 If a federal agency contends that its activities ury received over $89.3 billion from offshore leasing. COASTAL OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE, supra note 125, at 52; see also Swenson, supra note 190, at 864. 196 . State value judgments and perceptions of cost determine the types of restrictions on coastal activities a CMP will impose. For example, Florida's CMP-a compilation of state statutes and rules that existed before the implementation of the state's CMP, FLA. STAT. ch. 380.21(2) (1987)-reveals the state's concern over costs resulting from federal activity harming sensitive coastal and marine environments and recreation resources. The CMP requires federal agencies to consider effects on the many reefs and other coastal and marine environments that are considered sensitive environmental areas. Telephone Interview with Jasmin Raffington, Florida Federal Consistency Coordinator (Sept. 23, 1993) ; see also FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05 (1987) (defining the process for designating areas of critical state concern). Most Florida coastal areas that could be used for federal activities, such as OCS oil and gas leasing, are in close proximity to such sensitive areas, and therefore the federal agency must take special precautions to ensure consistency with the provisions protecting these resources. Telephone Interview with Jasmin IV. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE FEDERAL AGENCY 475 No single factor that courts use to allocate burdens of proof indisputably points to the appropriate allocation in a section 307(c)(l) consistency dispute. Ultimately, to resolve the issue properly courts must consider the CZMA's policy, 1 9 9 which convincingly points toward allocating the burden to the federal agency. Allocation to the federal agency would help effectuate the CZMA's policy of granting to states control over the coastal zone and favoring protection over development interests in the coastal zone. 2 00
Other issues raised in Part Ill's analysis of the factors courts use in allocating the burden of proof, however, suggest that the allocation solution needs fine tuning. The examination of the language, regulations, and legislative history revealed the concern that granting states too much control over the coastal zone would enable them unilaterally to halt-that is, to veto-federal activities. 201 Moreover, this examination indicated that the federal agency makes the final prelitigation consistency determination that would normally require deference by the courts. 202 This Note considered and disposed of arguments arising from these issues that pointed toward allocating the burden of proof to the states. 203 Nevertheless, the arguments have some merit. It is possible, though, to alleviate the concerns over the veto issue and to give due respect to the federal agency's determination while keeping the ultimate burden of proof on the federal agency. Courts should require the state to make some initial showing -meet some initial burden of production -that demonstrates that the federal agency's activity is inconsistent with the state CMP. 204 The court should require the state to present the federal consistency determination and the state's official response objecting to the determination and indicating reasonable alternatives that would make the federal activity consistent. 205 204. One easily imagined initial showing would be to make out a prima facie case that the federal activity is inconsistent. The state would advance sufficient evidence regarding why it found the federal agency activity inconsistent with its coastal management plan. If the judge decides that a reasonable jury could find in the state's favor, the state has met its prima facie burden and creates a presumption of inconsistency. After the state establishes a prima facie case, the federal agency would then have the responsibility to rebut the state's allegations, the ultimate burden of persuasion remaining with the federal agency. Accordingly, the state should prevail if the agency does not advance evidence to rebut the prima facie case, or if the agency evidence is not sufficient to meet the ultimate burden of persuasion. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Such a presentation should be sufficient [Vol. 92:438 this showing, the federal agency should have the responsibility to rebut the state's allegations with the ultimate burden of persuasion lying with the federal agency.206
Placing an initial burden of production on the state prevents it from controlling federal agency activities too easily. If the state is not encumbered by this burden, it will merely have to plead that the agency activity is inconsistent to shift the burdens of production and persuasion to the federal agency. Moreover, to avoid a system of incentives encouraging the states to seek judicial resolution of even the most minor consistency disputes, the state should bear some evidentiary costs to lay out a reasonable disagreement with the federal agency.
Allocating the initial burden of production to the state, but shifting the ultimate burden of persuasion to the federal agency, best achieves the overall policies of the Act. This rule upholds the protection interests of the CZMA and vests primary control with the states without giving them a wholesale veto power over federal activities. The burden-shifting solution also discourages states from bringing weak claims to the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The coastal resources of the United States will likely continue to face a barrage of environmentally detrimental attacks. The population near the coast will expand, thus prompting additional development pressures. The national need for recreation, energy, and sustenance will also lead to further demands to exploit coastal resources. Such pressures will likely lead to more frequent conflicts between states and the federal government, resulting in more numerous consistency disputes between federal agencies and coastal states under the Coastal Zone Management Act.
Currently, no sources clearly indicate who bears the burden of proof when such consistency disputes come before a court. The CZMA does not explicitly allocate the burden of proof, 207 and courts are divided on who bears the burden. 208 To determine the proper allocation, this Note examined methods that courts use in allocating burdens of proof2°9 and considered their application to litigation under CZMA section 307(c)(l). 210 No single method unequivocally indifor establishing a likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
206. This solution is equivalent to that found in certain disputes under the National Environ- cated who should bear the burden of proof in a consistency dispute. Guidance gleaned from the language, regulations, and legislative history of the CZMA weighed only slightly in favor of allocating the burden to the state. 211 Ease of access to evidence did not tip the scale in either direction. 212 Considering probabilities was equally inconclusive.213 In the end, the policy of the CZMA most clearly indicated who should bear the burden. 214 To effectuate the policy of the statute, which favors preservation over development interests and vests primary control over the coastal zone with the states, the federal agency should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion in a consistency dispute.
To prevent the state from exercising excessive influence over federal activities, however, the states should bear an initial burden of producing evidence to show that a legitimate dispute exists. 215 Placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the federal agency will best allow the states to account for the demands placed on their coastal zone by the federal government. Assigning the initial burden of production to the states, by requiring an initial showing of inconsistency, will amply protect federal interests while preventing overzealous interference by the states. 
